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Abstract—The Internet of Things and Services is a rapidly 
growing concept that illustrates that the ever increasing amount 
of physical items of our daily life which become addressable 
through a network could be made more easily manageable and 
usable through the use of Services. This surge of exposed 
resources along with the level of privacy and value of the 
information they hold, together with the increase of their usage 
make for an augmentation in the number of the security threats 
and violation attempts that existing security systems do not 
appear robust enough to address. In this paper, the authors 
underline this increase in risk and identify the requirements for 
resources to be more resilient in this type of environment while 
keeping an important level of flexibility. In addition, the authors 
propose an architectural model of Self Managed Security Cell, 
which leverages on current knowledge in large scale security 
systems, information management and autonomous systems. 
 
Index Terms— Internet of Things, Security, Service Oriented 
Architecture 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of the Internet of Things and Services (IoT&S) 
is based on the possibility of seamless integration of physical 
objects such as sensors or home appliances (i.e. things) and 
services, which can be loosely defined as a network interface 
that exposes a piece of functionality.  
The IoT&S is gaining momentum in the academic and 
industrial areas alike [1][2]. Many key enabling technologies 
such as middleware and sensor networking are now available, 
have gained maturity and their usage is expected to become 
more and more common. The IoT&S involves and leverages 
on current knowledge in automatic identification and 
communication of things and services. 
However, the envisioned world of pervasive computing 
would be closer to realisation if the embedded devices were 
able to communicate and interoperate with each other so as to 
cooperate. 
The development of this paradigm has indeed created new 
types of requirements that can be expressed in terms of the 
quantity of resources connected, density of the connections 
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and complexity to manage both elements together. The IoT&S 
encompasses that more and more resources (e.g. applications, 
devices) are exposed over the network (e.g. Internet, domestic, 
corporate, etc). These resources are linked in groups (e.g. 
federations) where one resource can be part of several clusters. 
For instance, one mobile phone device is in the user's 
domestic systems (with personal laptop, mobile, car, etc) and 
in his company's (with other corporate “things” such as 
computers, servers, printers, etc.) if this one has been provided 
by it. This means that more than one entity can administrate 
the resources, at times only in specific context, and sets 
policies for them. In term of management, some of these 
policies might be relevant only for a specific resource, in a 
particular context, some others relevant for different resources 
in the same federation. For instance a spam filter of an email 
box and contacts details in messaging tools could be reused by 
the same user to filter calls as well as texts on his mobile. 
In this paper, the authors focus on the need to define and 
comprehend the requirements that have risen with the IoT&S 
in order to model a generic architectural framework to secure 
resources. The goal of this work is not to define yet another 
security protocol or grammar, but to attempt to identify an 
architecture that leverages on the existing knowledge in large 
scale security systems, information management and 
autonomous systems. This model underlines the need for 
interoperability, decentralisation, automation and 
contextualisation in modern security systems. 
First, let us define a resource as an asset that is exposed on a 
network. Typical assets are applications or devices. The first 
type covers a wide range from data service or email software, 
to business application. Devices are becoming an increasingly 
important part of network as technologies develop. Indeed, 
current mobile devices are now equipped with a network 
interface, the use of sensor is also spreading and in a near 
future it seems unavoidable that cars, fridges and other 
everyday tools will follow. 
In the first section, the objectives of this paper are the 
established, then the specific requirements for security in the 
IoT&S are listed and related works are introduced. Following 
this, a model that takes into account the previous discussion is 
presented and a potential implementation of it is shortly 
introduced and discussed. 
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II. OBJECTIVES 
We believe that such issues can be resolved by developing 
an infrastructure that manages all communications between 
resources. We want to investigate and develop security 
mechanisms as part of a third party infrastructure or dedicated 
layer that mediates communications between resources while 
at the same time it does not challenge the organisational 
policies of those services. 
Our view is that the infrastructure can exist as a set of 
managed components, ideally when possible services, that 
users can make use of in order to dependably expose a 
resource on a network. We would like to avoid imposing any 
additional requirements at the resource side by offering 
flexibility as part of the infrastructure that would not 
compromise aspects of the resource. Numerous solutions seem 
to be tailored to particular domains that require some degree 
of trade off between those important non-functional 
properties. We want to offer such flexibility at the level of the 
infrastructure in terms of message transfer protocols that do 
not compromise the policies of those resources. The aim is to 
enable resources to be network ready without any 
prerequisites that challenge their autonomy. The added value 
of the infrastructure is that it enables the use of resources 
without imposing any architectural constraints and at the same 
time maintaining the responsibility for the delivery of a 
message and its support of certain attributes. Given the earlier 
discussion these guarantees may relate to fairness, audit, 
anonymity and privacy, but we are also looking to extend or 
complement these with mechanisms pricing and others as 
presented by the authors in [3]. 
III. REQUIREMENTS FOR A SECURITY CELL 
The principal ideas presented in this paper are that in order 
to deal with and improve the security of resources in large 
scale distributed systems there is a strong need to address the 
following requirements: 
A. Interoperability 
The interoperability issue in the security of IoT&S can be 
separated in three main domains. The first addresses the 
semantic of communication, the second the grammar of 
communication and finally the third regards the operational 
connection. This last point will be developed in the next 
section on automation.  
In order for resources to understand each other, the first 
factor is to be able to know what the data exchanged means. 
For instance, two antivirus software from different brands are 
not capable of using each other’s security patches and updates. 
This issue, when applied to an even wider audience (e.g. anti 
spam together with firewall antivirus), increased the 
complexity even more. Two types of mechanisms have been 
created to address this, translation protocols and common 
standardised semantics. 
 
 -- Security ontologies and translation mechanisms have 
been developed in order for different firewall and anti virus 
software to exchange data [4][5][6].  
 
If resources can understand the semantic of the data they 
exchange, they do not necessarily express the same fact using 
a shared grammar. In SOA, a field very active in the domain 
of interoperability, several grammars have been developed and 
are used for security related issues:  
 
 -- eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) [7][8] is an XML based OASIS Web service 
oriented standard for communicating access control policies 
between services. 
 -- Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
[9][10][11] standard is an OASIS standardised specification 
for expressing, requesting and delivering assertions regarding 
the credentials of various entities (users, computers, printers 
etc). Shibboleth is well known implementation of SAML, 
implemented on the OpenSAML [12] APIs.  
 -- SecPAL is a policy and token authoring language 
developed by Microsoft Corporation [13]. It combines access 
control policies and security tokens under the same grammar 
which in turn conforms to a formal model. An XML schema 
for serializing SecPAL policies and tokens into XML.  
The aforementioned grammars could benefit the IoT&S by 
providing a standard access control policy language replacing 
dozens of application-specific languages such as 
[14][15][16][17][18]. The interest with XACML and SecPAL 
is that they allow answering both issues of securing the 
content exchanged and the communication interfaces. 
Additionally the potential of providing semantic translators 
between grammars should also be examined. 
B. Automation 
The automation of the security tasks is of paramount 
importance in the IoT&S. Indeed, as the amount of resources 
and their level of associations increase, matched with the 
potential augmentation in usage and the fact that these 
resources are exposed on a network, it becomes less and less 
viable for a human based management, at least at the single 
device level. The lack of automation can create two types of 
issue regarding detection of threat and action based upon the 
detection. The first one being that all resources cannot be 
manually made aware of all new threats as these evolve and 
new are created. The second one regards the decisions and 
actions that have to be taken upon detection of a threat. If we 
assume that interoperability has been achieved (c.f. previous 
chapter on interoperability), then resources are capable of 
understanding each other’s security related information. What 
automation promotes is a more advanced interoperability 
regarding the exposure of management type interfaces which 
allow exchanging data and permit resources to know how to 
manipulate each other – when allowed – in order to take 
actions. Two main standards have been developed in order to 
allow this: 
 -- Web Services Distributed Management (WS-DM) 
[19], an OASIS standard, tackles simplifying the management 
of heterogeneous IT resources. WSDM defines a standard way 
of how to represent and access the management interfaces. 
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 -- Still in the SOA domain, WS-Management (WS-M) 
[20] is a specification of a SOAP-based protocol for the 
management of servers, devices and applications. It provides a 
common way for systems to access and exchange management 
information across the IT infrastructure. 
C. Decentralisation 
Many resources maintain their own policy stores, typical 
examples are email clients which allow creating and managing 
their own rules. For practical reasons it is therefore 
unavoidable to manage decentralised information store and 
decision making. Additionally, for security reasons it is best 
not to duplicate and share security related data outside of its 
context. 
D. Contextualisation 
Resources can be required to offer different functions and 
different types of data according to the situation. The faculty 
to adequately segregate context without allowing them to 
overlap is a key requirement in the IoT&S. Additionally, it 
might be unavoidable for some resources to be dependant of 
different types and sources of management in different 
contexts (c.f. mobile device scenario in the introduction). 
 
Practically, these requirements mean that instead of an 
administrator reading logs sent by different security related 
systems (e.g. anti spam, firewall, anti virus) and making 
decisions upon the understanding and use of this information, 
we would need the relationship between receiving the 
information and acting automated. In addition, due to the 
dynamic nature and large scale of the Internet, resources 
should be able to automatically discover what other resources 
it might be relevant to pull data from and push to. This would 
help increasing the dynamicity of the updates and potentially 
improving the security by improving the general security 
related awareness. Finally, a resource should be made aware 
of the potentiality of interacting in different environments 
under different constraints. 
IV. RELATED WORK 
The notion IoT&S encompasses a wider range of devices 
that use TCP/IP and protocols on top of that to communicate 
with PC’s or other devices. Mobile phones, car navigators, 
handheld cameras are but a few embedded devices that that 
are part of this notion. A lot of these devices use web service 
technology as a means to communicate or synchronise 
themselves with other ‘things’ on the internet. Apart from 
typical consumer products the notion of IoT&S has extended 
to manufacturing and industrial automation. Factory shop 
floors are typically filled with sensors, robots, and other smart 
embedded devices. Typically a production line works in 
isolation according to some ERP (Enterprise Resource 
Planning) specification. Getting production line embedded 
devices to talk in real time to ERP systems can be beneficial. 
Technologies such as the ones that consumer devices use are 
the obvious one to be tried first. The need for developing web 
services type interfaces for shop floor embedded devices is 
being currently addressed in [21]. Web services are used to 
wrap part of the devices’ functionality in order to allow 
bidirectional communication between back end ERP services. 
The reason can vary between simple auditing and monitoring 
to dynamic reconfiguration and troubleshooting. SOA devices 
are also becoming popular [22], being able to expose the 
interface of part of the functionality of a device can be 
beneficial.  
Device Profile for Web services is an XML specification for 
defining standard APIs for such devices. Although in its 
infancy it is currently assessed in car production lines and 
other domains [23]. In an area where SAP mainly dominated 
with XMii and their set of proprietary protocols Web services 
and the related specs provided a sense of freedom between 
rigid devices (shop floor) and the internet. 
Self-Managed Cell (SMC) [24], a policy-based architecture 
that integrates services, managed resources and a policy 
interpreter by means of an event bus is used in [25] to manage 
body sensor networks. Body sensor networks consist of on-
body wireless sensors attached to patients to monitor the 
health and well being. Such systems need to adapt 
autonomously to changes in context, user activity, device 
failure, and the availability or loss of services.  
The notion of self managed cells is also interested and it 
would provide an extension to the current state of research in 
the area of self managed embedded devices. Karnouskos [26] 
expressed the need to self managed devices that are aware of 
their state (hence being able to transmit it) as well as their 
interface (so that other devices can link to them). The 
complete self management life cycle of a device would be 
complemented using a set of protocols and configuration 
interfaces that would enable devices to self ‘heal’ or configure 
dynamically according to the collective state reached by the 
shop floor. Current research and market analysis shows that 
smart devices are important in the not too far future. Many 
large IT companies are moving in areas such as industrial 
automation, house automation, as well as embedded device 
integration and research areas where issues such as self 
management and autonomy are addressed are important. 
V. ANATOMY OF A SECURITY CELL 
In [27], a pattern of Self-Managed Cells (SMC) that can be 
federated is defined. In the following chapter we leverage on 
this pattern to define a model of Self Managed Security Cells 
(SMSC). 
The SMC model was designed to be able to configure itself 
with little or no user input and to adapt autonomously to 
changes. SMCs are typically composed of Policy, Discovery 
and Role services which through an event bus allow managing 
a resource through measurement and control adapters. SMC is 
therefore a strong candidate for the IoT&S as it takes into 
account the strong need for automation and autonomic. The 
model was however not designed to deal with security and 
moreover to leverage on the scale of the network to attend to 
improve it. The policy service is also inadequate as it only 
targets adaptation strategies. The SMSC model adds security 
and management oriented components to the SMC in order to 
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 render it capable of securing communications and behavior of 
the protected resource(s) with potentially the capacity to 
leverage on the amount of resources federated to improve the 
security of the network. 
This refined model takes into account the requirements 
previously introduced in this paper in order to propose a 
scalable security enhancement system for distributed 
resources. It is however noticeable that in the case of the 
SMSC the system is no longer aimed at being fully 
autonomous as user input is expected (e.g. user add excluded 
domain by flagging email as spam). Another key point is that 
these services, for performance or business reasons, could be 
centralised for a set of resources just as they could be placed 
on the resource. 
 
Figure 1 “Self Managed Security Cell” presents a logical 
view of the model. 
 
 
Figure 1. Self Managed Security Cell 
The responsibilities of the core services shown in Figure 1 
are described below. 
A. Message bus 
The role of the message bus is to provide connectivity to the 
different parts of the SMSC. This can require providing 
different options such as synchronous and asynchronous 
communication. A complete model of such middleware is 
described in [28]. 
B. Discovery 
In order to improve the knowledge of one cell, it is essential 
to discover other components that could improve it. In a non 
centralised system this is best left to each component to 
potentially advertise itself, let resources register one to another 
when relevant or possibly discovering partners trough 
managed registries (e.g. UDDI). The discovery service’s aims 
are to discover new partners and to allow the managed 
resource to get to know them (e.g. what they do, who/what 
manage them, etc). 
C. Resource catalogue 
The resource catalogue allows holding the information 
about other cells, the different policies (e.g. access control, 
adaptation, etc) and configuration files necessary for the 
managed resource. 
D. Policy management 
Given the plethora of policies in conjunction with the fact 
that there is not a single authority that governs these policies 
(the majority will stem from user requirements on how they 
want to protect their resources) validation is needed to make 
sure that there are no logical inconsistencies.  
E. Access control and Identity management 
In earlier publications [29] we discussed the advantages and 
disadvantages of access control models, ranging from active 
control lists to role and task based systems. We concluded that 
grid computing requires infrastructure that deals with dynamic 
rights activation and deactivation and more importantly 
delegation. Cloud computing also brings together a number of 
resources accessible via standard web protocols. This 
reinforces well documented requirements such as the need for 
granularity, single sign on and federation but it also exposes 
some new ones.  
Delegation is important and in particular in grid computing. 
Several authors have elaborated on this issue [30][31][32]. 
The reason being that given the sensitivity of the information 
that may be shared in some grid environments (which raises 
concerns regarding competitive advantage) parties are not 
expected to be assigned a single set of rights (held by roles) 
that would last throughout the life time of a domain. It is more 
likely that limited or gradual access to their resources would 
be granted. In order to support such dynamic behaviour a 
language the handles delegation models with ease is desirable. 
Usability is also a major issue. Unfortunately a number of 
tools that offer similar services or target the same domain have 
failed to connect with developers and policy writers. We 
believe unnecessary complexity and poor usability play a 
major role in the success and consequent adaptation of such as 
language. Another criticism is that of the lack of clear 
semantics in Grid security tools. Our investigation in systems 
such as Permis and XACML [29] has shown that these 
systems lack any formal semantics of their constructs with the 
XML schema being the corner stone of their development.  
We need to address this and come up with a solution that 
combines all security related information under the same 
semantics. SecPAL has taken some steps towards this 
direction. Uniting both policies and security tokens has also 
been desirable in Grid environments. There have been 
attempts for example to combine XACML policies and SAML 
tokens at the XML level but have failed to address this issue at 
the level of semantics.  
F. Governance 
This service, together with the policy management insures 
that the incoming security “updates” and policies have a safe 
impact of the current policies. In addition, it tries to find out 
how current changes in the sate of the resource it manages 
could have an effect on known resources registered in the 
Resource Registry. Finally, it also allows exposing the 
resource and its data in different contexts, according to access 
policies and profiles as introduced in. More details on this 
precise component will be given in a future article in a special 
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issue on SOI of the British Telecom Technology Journal 
(BTTJ). 
G. Management interface 
The management interface allows remote configuration and 
management of the resource. As previously introduce, this 
type of interface is exposed according to certain standard to 
allow for interoperability and automation. 
H. Operational interface 
The operational interface is an access layer to the function 
of the resource itself. 
 
The SMC model [27] is appealing in this context as it takes 
into account the requirements of automation as well as 
decentralisation, allows managing many different types of 
resources and is extendable enough to tolerate the integration 
of components supporting the other requirements. 
 
VI. SERVICE ORIENTED INFRASTRUCTURE – SERVICE 
SECURITY GATEWAY (SOI-SSG) 
In the following part, the SOI-SSG [34], its main 
components and their roles are briefly introduced. In addition, 
a mapping with the Security Cell architecture previously 
presented is made in order to demonstrate the feasibility and 
practicality of the SMSC. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the security capabilities 
necessary for a typical Service Oriented Enterprise (SOE). In 
this section we focus on a core subset of the common 
capabilities that are necessary for a secure SOA realisation.  
The first capability focuses on the problems of protecting 
the exposure and availability of services to the network, and 
ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and accountability in their 
end-to-end interactions.  
An identity management component, the Security Token 
Service (STS) addresses the problems of identity brokerage 
federation and management of the life-cycle of circles-of-trust 
between identity brokers as well as the life-cycle of virtual 
identities and other security assertions that may be used in 
B2B collaborations. 
An access control capability, the Policy Decision Point 
(PDP) which focal points are service-level usage and access 
control in complex, multi-administrative environments is also 
used. 
A governance and policy management capability that allows 
for a safe contextualisation and usage of distributed policies is 
proposed. 
The requirements forming the basis of these elements have 
been elicited by studying the business and technological 
requirements of a large number of business cases and pilots in 
research projects such as TrustCoM [35][36] and BEinGRID 
[37][38]. 
Secure Service and Messaging Layer
Identity 
Brokerage
Usage &
Access 
Management
SOA Security
Autonomics
SOA Security
Analytics
SOA Security Governance Layer
IT administrators & 
capability mangers
Other 
common 
capabilities
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Application Services
SOA security capability Capability management / Policy provisioning & update
Management interface
Operational interface
Invocation of decision point
during policy execution
Event generation 
& notification
Management
Service 
Managed
Service 
Enforcement
Layer 
Decision
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Notification
Source 
Notification
Target  
Figure 2. Overview of the SOI-SSG capabilities. 
VII. SOI-SSG MODEL ON SECURE CELL 
This section brings the Secure Cell architecture in the heart 
of the SOI-SSG. The SSG is not targeted at managing 
particular “things” and therefore does not comport any 
operational or management interface serving this purpose. In 
addition, potential partners are required to register themselves 
through a federation [34], as the SOI-SSG does not aim at 
handling this level of management. The rest of the 
components however are direct matches and do closely 
conform to the Secure Cell architecture and guidelines 
presented in the previous sections. 
The resource catalog in the SOI-SSG can be found in two 
locations depending on its purpose. The collaboration 
management layer can maintain white pages / UDDI where 
services are made publicly available. In addition, each 
partner’s SOI-SSG governance layer also maintains an internal 
registry where resources are described and connectors stored. 
Policy management is ensured through the governance 
layer’s policy stores.  
Finally, the access control and identity management are the 
core functionalities of the SOI-SSG authorization service, 
identity broker and service gateway which enforces the 
authorisation decision identify users. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the authors have shortly introduced the 
concept of the Internet of Things & Services and linked it to 
the main software engineering domains it encompasses. 
Furthermore, the emphasis has been put on defining the 
requirements to secure resources in this large scale and 
dynamic paradigm. The key elements that have been identified 
are interoperability, automation, decentralisation and 
contextualisation. 
Following this, the authors have proposed an architectural 
model, Security Cell, which takes these requirements into 
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account and shortly described each of its components. 
An example of a potential application of this architecture 
has been presented and defined in the SOI-SSG. 
In future works, the authors will identify existing industrial 
products as well as research projects that attempt to address 
the issue of security in both this domain and related areas, and 
will analyse them against this model. 
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